Wednesday, 21 September 2016

Presidential outcome predictor Part 1

Wouldn't it be nice to know who wins the race to the White House in November this year? In this series I'll assess the possible scenarios.

Part 1 - Enablers and disablers of change

If it ain't broken, don't fix it. Don't change a winning team. And so on. The majority of humans tend to shun change until change becomes inevitable.

The US Constitution says you can only be president twice, so Barack is on his way out. Change is inevitable.

The biggest unanswered question is whether the change this year will be limited to the person or alter the political course as well.

If you're happy with the way Democrats have been running the country, you're likely to vote Hillary. If you're unhappy, you're likely to vote Donald.

This much seems pretty obvious. What if you're somewhat unhappy with Hillary, but not to the extent that you're ready to vote Donald? What if you're a little in favour of changing the Clinton-Barack course, but not to the point where you'd endorse the Bush-Donald way?

In a bipartisan setup, no political course is really new in that it's pretty much the same course as that followed 4-8-12 years ago. A bold leap into the future is, at the same time, a retreat into the past. Developed democracies go round and round, like cats chasing their tail.

This is where the presidential race gets both confusing and exciting.

T.b.c.

Friday, 1 July 2016

Structural considerations

A book on morality could have the following structure:

1. Intro: why morality is topical in the early 21st century
2. The case for the individual's rights... and obligations
3. The case for community rights and obligations
4. What makes morality fair and equitable
5. A typology of moral systems, i.e. they can be based on
        - intent
        - outcome
        - obligations
        - virtues
        - rights
        - externalities
        - why there is no clean type
6. The best historical attempts at ethics
        - Aristotle
        - Kant
        - Turgonyi, etc.
        - the idea is that the individual must make an effort
7. The equivalence rules
        - God's rules = what is good for the individual in the long run
        - God's will = what is good for humanity
        - God's intent = humanism
        - omniscience vs. personal responsibility
        - morality is fun
        - morality is also the best investment strategy
8. 21st century human-optimised ethics
        - business prosperity
        - speed bumps and roundabouts
        - environmental protection
        - good news for the commons

Individual vs. community

The individual is supposed to contribute to the community and vice versa, but what, why and wherefore? What is the essence of the relationship between the individual and her/his community?

Humans are teleological, i.e. they can think ahead with a goal in mind. Individuals form groups with common goals and call this setup a community. Clearly, all individuals must contribute to the achievement of common goals, otherwise they exclude themselves from the community. But as generations come and go, community membership becomes non-elective. It happens to one, as opposed to being consciously chosen by one. No-one shares each and every goal of the various smaller and larger communities (s)he happens to belong to. Which does not invalidate or delegitimise communities, but explains why there is so much confusion about this tangled relationship.

In principle, the individual could choose what communities (s)he wished to belong to. But in practice, this would lead to inconsistency. For instance, an individual allegedly could choose to not be part of a national community, but the same individual could not choose to not be part of a tax community, which is pretty much the same community. If such contradictions were allowed, this would result in an ad hoc concept of the individual - community relationship. It would amount to suggesting that a person can choose membership of a certain kind (national), but cannot choose membership of another kind (taxation). The difference between the two kinds of membership is unclear, it appears to be more of a matter of personal taste. This would introduce a double standard: the same person would be free regarding Membership A but not free regarding Membership B. The idea of a double standard can be challenged by using the example of a club. No-one is forced to be a member of a club. But in what ways is a national community a club, whereas a tax community not a club? Doesn't the national community set up the government organisation that collects taxes? If so, the distinction between the two communities is unclear. It would be hard to argue that membership in one is optional, whereas membership in the other is mandatory.

We could use war as a counter-example: a pacifist may choose to not go to war for her/his community. But in practice, this does not exempt the pacifist from punishment for breaking the rules of her/his community. Progeny may decide in the pacifist's favour, but this won't save her/him from whatever consequence is applicable at the time. On the one hand, this is a relatively rare sub-case of mandatory community membership, and on the other, it doesn't actually alter the contemporary relationship. This demonstrates that membership in one or more unwanted communities is mandatory.

So, can an individual who prefers not to be a member of a moral community be forced to be a member nonetheless? That appears to be the case. It clearly is the case with people who object to community membership in common law cases. A murderer cannot say (s)he does not wish to be a member of her/his moral community and thus escape the consequences. It would be all too easy to argue that though (s)he was born with a specific nationality, (s)he relinquished it just before committing the crime, so (s)he is under no court's authority and must be released. This argument doesn't convince any judge anywhere in the world, which is second-line confirmation that moral membership is considered legally binding.

Does mandatory moral membership apply to marital fidelity, too? It does, and entails legal consequences to the extent legal consequences exist. If there are no legal consequences, membership is still mandatory, though it doesn't materialise in a court sentence. That doesn't mean the affected person is also required to agree - (s)he is not required to agree with a court sentence either, but either it doesn't alter the sentence, or it can be regarded as an aggravating circumstance and make the verdict even worse.

Individuals are required to contribute to the achievement of community goals, and the community is required to promote the individual's happiness and flourishment. The community does so primarily by ensuring the background in which this can happen. Individual happiness and flourishment require community structures, in the absence of which individuals will wilt, rather than flourish. In other words, the community must enable happiness and flourishment.

In conclusion, the individual belongs to a moral community on a mandatory basis, is required to contribute to the achievement of the common goals, and in return, the community must promote the individual's happiness and flourishment.

What makes morality just

A moral system must meet three fundamental criteria in order to be considered fair and equitable. The first criterion is that it should maximise the happiness and flourishing of all those involved. The second is that it should use a single standard. The third is that it should minimise the burden on all those involved.

The first criterion is fairly straightforward, it means that two proposed "moral" systems can be compared with each-other on the basis of how happy and flourished their stakeholders are. The one that makes its stakeholders happier and more flourished is the fairer and more equitable moral system.

The second criterion can be tested in several ways. Jesus of Nazareth suggests that everyone is to be measured by her/his own standards. Thomas Hobbes suggests that no individual should vindicate more rights to her/himself than (s)he is ready to grant to others. Immanuel Kant suggests that every act of each person should be governed by universal rules that apply to everyone irrespective of time and place. All three formulations hinge on the same idea and lead to the same outcome. Two proposed moral systems can be compared on the basis of how uniform their rules are. The one that applies more uniform rules is the fairer and more equitable moral system.

The third criterion tailors morality to human nature in that humans prefer freedom and ease to contstraints and burdens. Two proposed moral systems can be compared on the basis of how burdensome they are for all those involved. The one that is less burdensome is the fairer and more equitable moral system.

So in principle, the fairest and most equitable moral system is one that makes every human as happy as possible, relies on absolutely uniform rules, and does not burden anyone at all. Unfortunately, there is no such moral system. Every proposed behaviour rule-set compromises on at least two of the three criteria, but mostly on all three: it leaves some people less happy than they could possibly be, it may not apply completely uniform rules, and it necessarily burdens everyone to an extent. However, that does not invalidate the criteria, and of all proposed moral systems, the one that makes people the happiest, applies the most uniform rules, and burdens people the least will be the fairest and most equitable one. 

We have yet to wait for a gold medalist.

In the next part we'll look at what/how the individual should contribute to the community and vice versa.

Friday, 24 June 2016

How preferences are reconciled

Can everyone's preferences be met? Certainly not, because some preferences contradict each-other. Most people prefer to have property and are willing to work to earn it. Some people, on the other hand, prefer to minimise the effort and not work for property but to steal it from others. These two preferences clearly cannot be reconciled with each-other, we had better brace ourselves for conflict.

While everyone prefers to have sex with the person (s)he desires and most people accept a firm refusal from that person, some people prefer to force the person to have sex nonetheless. Fulfilling this preference is commonly called rape. In this case, the preferences of a rapist cannot be reconciled with the preferences of the victim.

As a rule of thumb, moral persons are expected to control and delay their urges, and to satisfy them only in socially acceptable ways.

It would be unreasonable to expect a proposed moral system to reconcile everyone's preferences with everyone else's.

Fine-tuning the definition of preference to mean only reasonable preference may help here, but at the expense of clarity. By stating that a fair and equitable moral system can reconcile everyone's reasonable preferences with everyone else's reasonable preferences, we create confusion about what is reasonable. It is much clearer to say that any proposed moral system can only reconcile morally compatible preferences, and any system that promises more is trying to mislead those involved.

Can morality make everyone happy?

The best moral system in the world would be one that makes everybody as happy as possible. But can everybody be happy? As long as everybody's preferences are aligned to behaviour rules, everybody can be happy in a moral way. However, experience suggests that not everybody's preferences are in line with the moral code, which means that they can only be happy by breaking the rules. If the rules are enforced, these people won't be happy. So although it would be nice to make everyone happy, this is clearly impossible. For example, you can't protect private property and make thieves happy at the same time.

Can a moral system be challenged on the grounds that it keeps some people unhappy? Only if people agree that those who are currently unhappy could be made happy in a harmless way. If making rule-breakers happy is harmless, the rule should be scrapped. On the other hand, if breaking the rule is actually considered harmful, the rule should be upheld and the unhappiness of those who could only be happy by breaking it should be accepted as inevitable. Murderers may challenge morality on the grounds that it's leaving them unhappy, but their challenge will not lift the ban on killing. Let murderers be unhappy if they insist on their preference for killing people. You can't please everybody, and though you are expected to make a reasonable effort, you are not expected to reconcile a contradiction in terms.

Brexit and its aftermath

Frankly, I never saw Brexit coming. Not in a million years. It took me completely by surprise. And I think its implications will take Brits by surprise, too. They include financial consequences and, perhaps, another Scottish referendum on leaving the UK. A referendum in Northern Ireland? We'll see.

I remain optimistic, because we are talking about a self-regulating framework here: if the financial projections were correct, the UK stands to lose out economically. When and if it does, people may have second thoughts about Brexit and stage a new referendum to stay. On the other hand, if these consequences never manifest themselves, the projections weren't technically correct, and there'll be no reason for buyer's remorse. Either case works out well for those involved.

I would caution against playing down the importance of the majority. That would amount to playing down democracy itself. The majority decides is the name of the game.

As for the campaign, the EU wasn't sold well. Those responsible for selling the European project to at least 51 percent of the European voting public may draw the conclusions and follow Cameron's resignation. Then again, they may not draw the conclusions and continue to not sell the EU's benefits well to citizens. This is also a self-regulating framework: the longer EU leaders continue to not sell the project well, the harder they'll fall. Input leads to proportional output. The EU may be the best co-operation process in the world - I certainly think it is - but it's up to leaders to make sure this gets reflected in public perception. It may take better selling techniques, better packaging and occasionally, better substance.

I hope soon we'll see a team of EU leaders who can enthuse citizens about the European project - by clearly showing that it works, that it makes sense, that it leaves everyone better off, and that it offers the brightest future anybody on this continent can wish for.