Wednesday 21 September 2016

Presidential outcome predictor Part 1

Wouldn't it be nice to know who wins the race to the White House in November this year? In this series I'll assess the possible scenarios.

Part 1 - Enablers and disablers of change

If it ain't broken, don't fix it. Don't change a winning team. And so on. The majority of humans tend to shun change until change becomes inevitable.

The US Constitution says you can only be president twice, so Barack is on his way out. Change is inevitable.

The biggest unanswered question is whether the change this year will be limited to the person or alter the political course as well.

If you're happy with the way Democrats have been running the country, you're likely to vote Hillary. If you're unhappy, you're likely to vote Donald.

This much seems pretty obvious. What if you're somewhat unhappy with Hillary, but not to the extent that you're ready to vote Donald? What if you're a little in favour of changing the Clinton-Barack course, but not to the point where you'd endorse the Bush-Donald way?

In a bipartisan setup, no political course is really new in that it's pretty much the same course as that followed 4-8-12 years ago. A bold leap into the future is, at the same time, a retreat into the past. Developed democracies go round and round, like cats chasing their tail.

This is where the presidential race gets both confusing and exciting.

T.b.c.

Friday 1 July 2016

Structural considerations

A book on morality could have the following structure:

1. Intro: why morality is topical in the early 21st century
2. The case for the individual's rights... and obligations
3. The case for community rights and obligations
4. What makes morality fair and equitable
5. A typology of moral systems, i.e. they can be based on
        - intent
        - outcome
        - obligations
        - virtues
        - rights
        - externalities
        - why there is no clean type
6. The best historical attempts at ethics
        - Aristotle
        - Kant
        - Turgonyi, etc.
        - the idea is that the individual must make an effort
7. The equivalence rules
        - God's rules = what is good for the individual in the long run
        - God's will = what is good for humanity
        - God's intent = humanism
        - omniscience vs. personal responsibility
        - morality is fun
        - morality is also the best investment strategy
8. 21st century human-optimised ethics
        - business prosperity
        - speed bumps and roundabouts
        - environmental protection
        - good news for the commons

Individual vs. community

The individual is supposed to contribute to the community and vice versa, but what, why and wherefore? What is the essence of the relationship between the individual and her/his community?

Humans are teleological, i.e. they can think ahead with a goal in mind. Individuals form groups with common goals and call this setup a community. Clearly, all individuals must contribute to the achievement of common goals, otherwise they exclude themselves from the community. But as generations come and go, community membership becomes non-elective. It happens to one, as opposed to being consciously chosen by one. No-one shares each and every goal of the various smaller and larger communities (s)he happens to belong to. Which does not invalidate or delegitimise communities, but explains why there is so much confusion about this tangled relationship.

In principle, the individual could choose what communities (s)he wished to belong to. But in practice, this would lead to inconsistency. For instance, an individual allegedly could choose to not be part of a national community, but the same individual could not choose to not be part of a tax community, which is pretty much the same community. If such contradictions were allowed, this would result in an ad hoc concept of the individual - community relationship. It would amount to suggesting that a person can choose membership of a certain kind (national), but cannot choose membership of another kind (taxation). The difference between the two kinds of membership is unclear, it appears to be more of a matter of personal taste. This would introduce a double standard: the same person would be free regarding Membership A but not free regarding Membership B. The idea of a double standard can be challenged by using the example of a club. No-one is forced to be a member of a club. But in what ways is a national community a club, whereas a tax community not a club? Doesn't the national community set up the government organisation that collects taxes? If so, the distinction between the two communities is unclear. It would be hard to argue that membership in one is optional, whereas membership in the other is mandatory.

We could use war as a counter-example: a pacifist may choose to not go to war for her/his community. But in practice, this does not exempt the pacifist from punishment for breaking the rules of her/his community. Progeny may decide in the pacifist's favour, but this won't save her/him from whatever consequence is applicable at the time. On the one hand, this is a relatively rare sub-case of mandatory community membership, and on the other, it doesn't actually alter the contemporary relationship. This demonstrates that membership in one or more unwanted communities is mandatory.

So, can an individual who prefers not to be a member of a moral community be forced to be a member nonetheless? That appears to be the case. It clearly is the case with people who object to community membership in common law cases. A murderer cannot say (s)he does not wish to be a member of her/his moral community and thus escape the consequences. It would be all too easy to argue that though (s)he was born with a specific nationality, (s)he relinquished it just before committing the crime, so (s)he is under no court's authority and must be released. This argument doesn't convince any judge anywhere in the world, which is second-line confirmation that moral membership is considered legally binding.

Does mandatory moral membership apply to marital fidelity, too? It does, and entails legal consequences to the extent legal consequences exist. If there are no legal consequences, membership is still mandatory, though it doesn't materialise in a court sentence. That doesn't mean the affected person is also required to agree - (s)he is not required to agree with a court sentence either, but either it doesn't alter the sentence, or it can be regarded as an aggravating circumstance and make the verdict even worse.

Individuals are required to contribute to the achievement of community goals, and the community is required to promote the individual's happiness and flourishment. The community does so primarily by ensuring the background in which this can happen. Individual happiness and flourishment require community structures, in the absence of which individuals will wilt, rather than flourish. In other words, the community must enable happiness and flourishment.

In conclusion, the individual belongs to a moral community on a mandatory basis, is required to contribute to the achievement of the common goals, and in return, the community must promote the individual's happiness and flourishment.

What makes morality just

A moral system must meet three fundamental criteria in order to be considered fair and equitable. The first criterion is that it should maximise the happiness and flourishing of all those involved. The second is that it should use a single standard. The third is that it should minimise the burden on all those involved.

The first criterion is fairly straightforward, it means that two proposed "moral" systems can be compared with each-other on the basis of how happy and flourished their stakeholders are. The one that makes its stakeholders happier and more flourished is the fairer and more equitable moral system.

The second criterion can be tested in several ways. Jesus of Nazareth suggests that everyone is to be measured by her/his own standards. Thomas Hobbes suggests that no individual should vindicate more rights to her/himself than (s)he is ready to grant to others. Immanuel Kant suggests that every act of each person should be governed by universal rules that apply to everyone irrespective of time and place. All three formulations hinge on the same idea and lead to the same outcome. Two proposed moral systems can be compared on the basis of how uniform their rules are. The one that applies more uniform rules is the fairer and more equitable moral system.

The third criterion tailors morality to human nature in that humans prefer freedom and ease to contstraints and burdens. Two proposed moral systems can be compared on the basis of how burdensome they are for all those involved. The one that is less burdensome is the fairer and more equitable moral system.

So in principle, the fairest and most equitable moral system is one that makes every human as happy as possible, relies on absolutely uniform rules, and does not burden anyone at all. Unfortunately, there is no such moral system. Every proposed behaviour rule-set compromises on at least two of the three criteria, but mostly on all three: it leaves some people less happy than they could possibly be, it may not apply completely uniform rules, and it necessarily burdens everyone to an extent. However, that does not invalidate the criteria, and of all proposed moral systems, the one that makes people the happiest, applies the most uniform rules, and burdens people the least will be the fairest and most equitable one. 

We have yet to wait for a gold medalist.

In the next part we'll look at what/how the individual should contribute to the community and vice versa.

Friday 24 June 2016

How preferences are reconciled

Can everyone's preferences be met? Certainly not, because some preferences contradict each-other. Most people prefer to have property and are willing to work to earn it. Some people, on the other hand, prefer to minimise the effort and not work for property but to steal it from others. These two preferences clearly cannot be reconciled with each-other, we had better brace ourselves for conflict.

While everyone prefers to have sex with the person (s)he desires and most people accept a firm refusal from that person, some people prefer to force the person to have sex nonetheless. Fulfilling this preference is commonly called rape. In this case, the preferences of a rapist cannot be reconciled with the preferences of the victim.

As a rule of thumb, moral persons are expected to control and delay their urges, and to satisfy them only in socially acceptable ways.

It would be unreasonable to expect a proposed moral system to reconcile everyone's preferences with everyone else's.

Fine-tuning the definition of preference to mean only reasonable preference may help here, but at the expense of clarity. By stating that a fair and equitable moral system can reconcile everyone's reasonable preferences with everyone else's reasonable preferences, we create confusion about what is reasonable. It is much clearer to say that any proposed moral system can only reconcile morally compatible preferences, and any system that promises more is trying to mislead those involved.

Can morality make everyone happy?

The best moral system in the world would be one that makes everybody as happy as possible. But can everybody be happy? As long as everybody's preferences are aligned to behaviour rules, everybody can be happy in a moral way. However, experience suggests that not everybody's preferences are in line with the moral code, which means that they can only be happy by breaking the rules. If the rules are enforced, these people won't be happy. So although it would be nice to make everyone happy, this is clearly impossible. For example, you can't protect private property and make thieves happy at the same time.

Can a moral system be challenged on the grounds that it keeps some people unhappy? Only if people agree that those who are currently unhappy could be made happy in a harmless way. If making rule-breakers happy is harmless, the rule should be scrapped. On the other hand, if breaking the rule is actually considered harmful, the rule should be upheld and the unhappiness of those who could only be happy by breaking it should be accepted as inevitable. Murderers may challenge morality on the grounds that it's leaving them unhappy, but their challenge will not lift the ban on killing. Let murderers be unhappy if they insist on their preference for killing people. You can't please everybody, and though you are expected to make a reasonable effort, you are not expected to reconcile a contradiction in terms.

Brexit and its aftermath

Frankly, I never saw Brexit coming. Not in a million years. It took me completely by surprise. And I think its implications will take Brits by surprise, too. They include financial consequences and, perhaps, another Scottish referendum on leaving the UK. A referendum in Northern Ireland? We'll see.

I remain optimistic, because we are talking about a self-regulating framework here: if the financial projections were correct, the UK stands to lose out economically. When and if it does, people may have second thoughts about Brexit and stage a new referendum to stay. On the other hand, if these consequences never manifest themselves, the projections weren't technically correct, and there'll be no reason for buyer's remorse. Either case works out well for those involved.

I would caution against playing down the importance of the majority. That would amount to playing down democracy itself. The majority decides is the name of the game.

As for the campaign, the EU wasn't sold well. Those responsible for selling the European project to at least 51 percent of the European voting public may draw the conclusions and follow Cameron's resignation. Then again, they may not draw the conclusions and continue to not sell the EU's benefits well to citizens. This is also a self-regulating framework: the longer EU leaders continue to not sell the project well, the harder they'll fall. Input leads to proportional output. The EU may be the best co-operation process in the world - I certainly think it is - but it's up to leaders to make sure this gets reflected in public perception. It may take better selling techniques, better packaging and occasionally, better substance.

I hope soon we'll see a team of EU leaders who can enthuse citizens about the European project - by clearly showing that it works, that it makes sense, that it leaves everyone better off, and that it offers the brightest future anybody on this continent can wish for.

Tuesday 21 June 2016

For and against rules

Any community needs rules to function as intended. The transport community needs a highway code, the banking community needs a financial code of conduct, the media need a rulebook to guarantee the freedom of expression and ensure fair coverage, the consumer community needs consumer protection legislation, states need laws, etc. No community can function without rules, so they are very much needed.

However, most people dislike rules intuitively. I, too, dislike rules. It's part of my biology. It's part of almost everyone's biology. I even intuitively dislike the few people who impose rules per se. I definitely detest people who want me to have a bad time at work and create rules to make sure I can't enjoy myself while doing my job. I think it should be possible to work and simultaneously have a good time. Rules should make sure that I do my job, rather than make sure I don't have fun while I'm at it. In a broader context, life should be a pleasurable experience, and being part of a good community should always be more pleasurable than staying out of it. Excessive rules can ruin the mood, while no rules can ruin the community.

I can only be sold rules on the rationale that they serve a good and valid purpose, such as keeping a community safe and prosperous.

For and against moral rules
If humans were fully rational, rational rules would suffice. But since they are not fully rational, we also need emotional rules, aka morality. Emotions have the advantage of being faster and easier to condition. For example, if our eyes didn't have an involuntary shut-down mechanism for avoiding the impact of flying objects, most of us would soon have no eyes left. If children were not equipped with emotional rules against leaping from heights, soon there would be no children left. If women were not biologically and parentally conditioned to think twice before having sex, most of them would soon be trapped in unwanted pregnancies. So emotional (moral) rules are clearly necessary.

However, moral rules are a drag. Some moral rules are more observed in the breach and lead to hypocrisy. Some moral rules may no longer make sense and yet are not repealed, because being emotional, it's hard to measure them against a rational standard. Most importantly, moral rules put some degree of pressure on rule-breakers, and humans are biologically programmed to minimise pressure.

So both rational rules and emotional rules are a mixed blessing.

Monday 20 June 2016

The case for communities

Ask a Westerner whether communities are necessary and (s)he'll tell you they are optional and the individual should be free to choose whether (s)he wants to belong to any. So, community membership is supposed to be elective, and communities, especially nations, are to be transcended.

Then ask the same person whether (s)he agrees that highway codes, banking rules, court systems, media freedoms and central budget benefits are optional and you'll get a very different answer. Would (s)he like to drive in a place where people are free to break the highway code? Probably not. Would (s)he put money in a bank that has decided to opt out of the banking community? Absolutely not. Would (s)he live in a place where anyone could smash the editorial office if (s)he disagreed with a newspaper article? That's not a bright idea. Would (s)he agree to live with a court system that tries crime cases on an optional basis? No way. Would (s)he like to live in a transcended national community where local authorities are free to decide whether they will or will not pay social benefits? That sounds like a serious violation of human rights. Would (s)he agree that taxes are optional - also for the wealthy? Certainly not. Can these systems be transcended? It's a crazy notion.

Then what in the world is going on in people's minds?

Though most Westerners maintain that the obligations that come with a community should be optional, they also maintain that none of the rights that come from a community should be optional. Now, rights suppose that other people keep their obligations. In a system of no obligations, there are no rights either. If you transcend communities, you lose rights. Everybody would like to have optional obligations, but nobody would like everyone else to have optional obligations, too. A congruent understanding of communities accepts the mandatory nature of obligations, because everyone meeting their obligations is exactly what gives rise to rights.

So if we put two and two together, there is a very clear case for communities with mandatory membership and obligations.

Monday 6 June 2016

The Philosopher's Stone Issue 3

The need for ethics

There clearly is a need for ethics as a set of behavioural rules to safeguard community interests. How do we know there is such a thing as a community with its own interests? This can be demonstrated through a game theory example, the tragedy of the commons.

Villagers use common land to let their cows graze. The grass supports 5 cows per inhabitant. However, those who secretly put more cows out there realise a profit. Every villager has an incentive to exceed the allotted number of cows. This reduces the amount of food per cow, the land can no longer feed the cows, and the system inevitably collapses.

Leaving the number of cows up to the individual will inevitably lead to a tragic outcome. The commons can only be utilised for everyone's benefit by referring to community interest or the common good of all stakeholders, i.e. that of preventing overuse. Sustainability depends on whether community interest as such is acknowledged and safeguarded. The function of ethics is to safeguard community interests for the benefit of all the individuals involved.

The tragedy of the commons can be applied in a lot of ways: people should not lie or steal as any community is based on the idea that most statements are truthful and that property is respected. In the absence of that the community collapses. Ethics is there to sustain communities and keep them prosperous.

Sunday 22 May 2016

The Philosopher's Stone Issue 2

Evolution and our attitude to it

Evolution is a well-established scientific model of how organisms develop. Evolution presents a different view from the Creation Story in the Bible. In light of scienfitic facts, evolution wins, hands down.

Does it follow as Nietzsche and Hitler suggest that the strong have the right to oppress and even eliminate the weak? Evolution seems to suggest that that's what happens spontaneously. So, do we or do we not believe in the evolutionary model, after all?

The prominent atheist Richard Dawkins thinks evolution explains how we got here but it doesn't tell us what to do. This seems to be nonsense: physics explains how objects have got to where they are right now but it doesn't tell us how they'll move from now on? Now, honestly. That's not the way scientific models work, they explain how things happen in general. You can't draw an arbitrary cut-off line and say science is valid up until this morning, but not any further, this afternoon, we'll be governed by a different scientific model.

Suppose evolution was only valid until Darwin discovered it. Has it stopped since then? It obviously hasn't. Suppose it was only valid until Mr. Dawkins first said it doesn't tell us what to do. Has it stopped since then? No, it hasn't. Mr. Dawkins might want to rethink his position. Or when he says evolution doesn't tell us what to do, does he mean something else? Can he have a valid, though ill-expressed, point?

This is a thorny problem, so I need your help, readers. What do you think our attitude to evolution should be?

Some ideas: we could say
- evolution is what happens against our better wishes and utmost efforts or
- evolution is what was happening to us until we evolved consciousness or
- evolution is hampered rather than spurred on by those involved or
- evolution involves stress while conscousness reduces it, so calmly reflecting on evolution is a contradiction in terms
- or...

Saturday 21 May 2016

The biological root of patriarchism

The modern way of looking at a male-dominated society is to say that it's a social construct and should be changed into a more equitable model. I argue that male domination is primarily an evolutionary construct based on women's choice and can only be altered by changing that choice.

Women tend to choose men who are taller than themselves. If they changed their preference and went for men who are of the same height or just a bit shorter, soon society would automatically cease to be male-dominated and become equitable. I doubt though that this can be achieved through female will-power. Sexual attraction seems to be stronger than new-year's resolutions.

The solution is ridiculously clear and simple, yet lamentably out of reach: women should only have sex with men who are not taller than themselves and should have a lot of offspring to outnumber traditional populations. That's how evolution takes care of things. It's as undoable as it is simple.

Why are women attracted to taller men? Because traditionally, men are hunters, providers and protectors, fighting off other males if necessary. That takes brawn. Tall men with shorter women proved to be a more viable setup in the course of evolution and that is how they became the predominant construct. Women pass on the attraction to taller men to their daughters, granddaughters and so on, thus perpetuating patriarchal society.

City-dwelling women may no longer need taller brawny men for hunting, provision or protection, but their biological preference has not changed. Can they change it by making a conscious decision? Probably not, because procreation is instinctive. It's no use to marry someone who's shorter and then desire other men who are taller, because that will defeat the purpose.

What happens to women who choose taller men, hate patriarchism and don't have enough children to sustain numbers? They will spend their lives in an anachronism and since they won't have enough offspring, they will become a dwindling and frustrated minority. Their cause is doomed by their own behaviour. They are proverbially shooting themselves in the foot.

Conclusion: patriarchal society is here to stay, because in theory, you could argue that it's no longer necessary for city-dwellers, but women instinctively perpetuate it. You can't beat evolution, you can't cheat your own biology.

The Philosopher's Stone, Issue 1

Reading Nigel Warburton's A Little History of Philosophy has inspired me to try and develop a general model of reality and my/our place in it. Using an ancient parable, if philosophers are touching different parts of the same elephant and describing their experience in very different ways, it should be possible to synthesize their part-models and describe the elephant itself.

This series is my attempt at doing that. I'm not a philosopher, I've just read quite a bit a philosophy and got in the mood to philosophise. Your comments may - or may not - help me to improve.

I'll use Hegel's approach of thesis - anti-thesis - synthesis, i.e. I'll describe every issue from three angles wherever possible and also add the achievements of modern science.

Issue 1
Perception, Ideas and Reality

Plato thinks our idea of a perfect circle is more real than all the perceived imperfect circles around us. In nature, there is no such thing as a perfect circle. Where, then, does the idea of a perfect circle reside? Appearantly, on some higher plane of reality, says Plato.

Aristotle thinks that the imperfect circles in nature are what really matters, and our idea of a perfect circle is an abstraction of them. Science uses perfect circles only to model the real ones and to enable us to perform calculations about them.

Kant thinks that we cannot perceive of reality as it is, we can only bend it to suit the structure of our mind. We don't even know whether what look like imperfect circles in nature are actually circles or something else. The idea of a perfect circle is in our head, along with the idea of squares and rectangles, numbers, etc. This is what Kant calls metaphysics, i.e. the human mindscape.

In light of modern science, Kant seems to be right. We do not and can not know Reality as it is. We can only sort-of-know what is available to us through our senses and intellect. And we can intuit some more. The idea of a perfect geometric shape is not on a higher plane of reality, not in outer space, but inside our head. Our brain is wired so as to enable us to process perceived information to our advantage, this is part of our evolutionary edge. The idea of triangles, squares, circles and numbers allows us to shape our surroundings and prosper. We only intuit that the ideas fit the imperfect real stuff, we have no way of actually knowing that.

But since our senses have evolved as an adequate means of survival, we can be sure that - much as they represent reality inaccurately - they are accurate enough for our purposes. We can't know what reality exactly is like, but we can come close enough to knowing it, so we shouldn't worry too much about sensual accuracy, i.e. the reality gap.

Example: a snake sees heat spots as opposed to coloured and textured surface, because having such vision enables it to attack the warm parts where there is blood to carry its venom so that it can prey, feed and survive. Should a conscious snake worry about what it's missing? Should it stress about the unknowability of ultimate Reality? If it needed further information to succeed in evolutionary terms, it would develop more sophisticated senses through spontaneous mutation. When the problem arises, the solution is usually available in a few generations. There is no point in worrying about how you'll cross a bridge that is nowhere in sight. Evolution will enable you to cross it when you reach it.

Evolution helps organisms develop capabilities to the extent they are needed, but it also causes them to streamline, i.e. shed capabilities when they are not needed, in order to minimise the survival effort and thus improve the chances of survival. A conscious snake concerned about not seeing more than heat spots may be comforted by the thought that some prior snakes may actually have seen colour and texture but lost the ability as it was not required.

Of course, the human mind looks ahead and worries about all the potential bridges that may or may not need crossing in some distant future. We think about long-term solutions, and having an ultimate model of Reality as it is, rather than a perceived and imperfect sensory model, would certainly help us address any challenge before it arises. But we also know we can't develop more sophisticated senses unless they are mandated by evolution, which should put our mind at ease about the reality gap. There certainly is a gap, but the challenge that will expose a part of it will also help us close that relevant part.

Conclusion: Reality is ultimately unknowable, and this is a verifiable theoretical limitation, but in practice, we can know Reality at any evolutionary point well enough to survive and prosper.